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Key Messages
• Domestic laws are the ideal legal instrument to regulate
the mining sector, including in relation to its climate
impacts. However, considering that mining contracts
often serve as a stop-gap measure in the absence of
relevant laws, risk allocation provisions in investor–state
mining contracts and model mine development
agreements should be reframed from a climate change
lens to clearly allocate the risks associated with climate
change between states and mining companies. Because
current risk allocation provisions within mining contracts
fail to appropriately allocate climate change–related
risks, states and the communities surrounding the mine
may be at a greater risk of facing losses due to the effects
of climate change than mining companies.
• Mining activities, which are inherently hazardous,
introduce risks and impacts that can be exacerbated by
climate change. For instance, mining activities can
compete with communities for water in an area where
water stress risk is increasing because of climate change.
They can also exacerbate risks and impacts of climaterelated events. For instance, mining activities can
contribute to deforestation, which exacerbates soil
erosion, landslides, and flooding in the rainy season. We
summarize this situation by the phrase “climate-related
impacts of mining operations.”
• Given the growing foreseeability of climate-related
events, force majeure clauses should not cover them.
Instead, force majeure clauses should be centered on the
foreseeability and reasonableness of preventing the
impacts of events, and not on the foreseeability and
ability to prevent the event from occurring. Investors
should not be able to invoke force majeure to attempt to
escape contractual performance, arguing that they
“could not reasonably be expected to prevent or control”
climate-related events.
• Mining contracts should affirm the liability of the mining
company and its parent company for climate-related
impacts of mining operations, and impose on them the
obligation to indemnify the state and affected third
parties, explicitly mentioning individuals and
communities, for damages resulting from climaterelated impacts of mining operations.
• Companies should be contractually required to purchase
insurance policies from brokers who have specific tools
to analyze the global risks associated with climate

change. They should also be required to purchase
additional insurance for any site-specific risks. The
company should have to compensate the state if it fails
to purchase adequate insurance and, instead, the state
purchases the policy.
• Stabilization clauses should not be included in mining
contracts. If included, they should explicitly apply to
changes in fiscal policy only; specifically reaffirm the
state’s sovereign right to pass climate legislation, even if
it relates to fiscal policy (e.g., carbon taxes); and indicate
an expiration date.
• Companies and states should contractually agree that
they will come together every three to five years for goodfaith discussions about whether any provisions need to
be modified. These renegotiations should give special
consideration to the company’s climate-related
obligations and the clauses on insurance policies and
force majeure in light of scientific findings about
potential climate impacts. Additionally, the contract
could include a non-exhaustive list of events (e.g.,
updated local climate forecasts) that would trigger
renegotiations.
• Where feasible, climate concerns should be added to
standard environmental warranties. Contracts could
restate environmental and climate-related requirements
as forward-looking warranties made by the company to
remove any ambiguity about its obligations and the
consequences of failing to meet them.
• Step-in provisions should be included in mining
contracts to allow the state to step in and perform the
contractual obligations of the company during climate
emergencies. The provision should expressly provide
that the state inherits no liability and must be
compensated if its stepping-in was caused by a real or
anticipated breach by the company.
• Dispute settlement clauses in mining contracts should
require that disputes be heard before domestic courts.
Arbitration clauses should be avoided due to concerns
that arbitration lacks transparency, opportunities for
public participation, and appeals processes, and fails to
appropriately apply local law. Arbitration also often
involves high costs, encroaches on state sovereignty,
limits regulatory space, works against the rule of law, and
overrides public-interest determinations of domestic
regulatory and administrative agencies.
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1

Introduction

As the effects of climate change continue to worsen,
mining projects, the communities surrounding them,
and their host states are increasingly at risk of being
affected by environmental disasters, with
devastating social and economic consequences. Risk
allocation provisions included in investor–state
mining contracts, often considered boilerplate and
replicated in agreements without careful
consideration or negotiation, could potentially help
the parties assign responsibilities between
themselves and limit their losses in those cases.
However, traditional risk allocation clauses within
existing mining contracts, formulated before the
world acknowledged the severity of climate change,
do not adequately allocate climate-related risks and
impacts between states and companies.
The United Nations Human Rights Council recognizes
the “right to a clean, healthy and sustainable
environment as a human right,” 1 and international
guidelines like the United Nations Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) 2 encourage
companies to make their best effort to combat
climate change through mitigation as well as
adaptation measures. The highest court in the
Netherlands has recently interpreted them to apply
to all companies regardless of their home nation or
their willingness to voluntarily adhere to the
principles. 3 While the UNGPs do not address climate
change specifically, the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has
explained the inseparable link between climate
change and human rights due diligence: 4
States would be expected to take a range of
effective measures to protect against businessrelated climate change within their territory
and/or
jurisdiction.
Similarly,
business
enterprises may not be able to discharge their
responsibility to respect all internationally
recognized human rights unless they integrate
climate change considerations into their
human rights due diligence processes
[emphasis added].

4 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

Yet, the current risk allocation regime in contracts
would allow for many of the costs associated with
climate risks and impacts to be passed on to states or
communities, therefore giving mining investors little
incentive to adopt best practices in preparing for and
adapting to climate change realities. The potential
losses as a result of climate change could be
catastrophic, especially so for impoverished
communities near mining areas. Accordingly, host
states, mining investors, and lawyers advising them
should revisit risk allocation clauses in investor–state
mining contracts and reframe them from a climate
change lens.
An earlier publication by the Columbia Center on
Sustainable Investment (CCSI) explores whether
governments are using, and how they can use,
climate-specific investor obligations in model mine
development agreements and investor–state mining
contracts to advance climate goals. The paper
synthesizes findings and recommendations for six
categories of provisions: integrating renewable
energy into mining operations; reducing
deforestation; requiring a climate risk assessment
and community vulnerability assessment; regulating
water use; requiring tailings dam design
justifications; and integrating climate risks into
closure plans. 5
As the abovementioned publication acknowledges,
“laws are the ideal legal instrument to regulate the
mining sector’s contribution to climate mitigation
and adaptation,” 6 and therefore “climate change
considerations should be incorporated into the
climate, environmental, water, forestry, energy, or
mining laws of mineral-rich countries.” 7 Even so,
considering that legislative processes are often slow,
“governments may still consider updating model
mining development agreements (MMDAs), or
negotiating climate-related contractual provisions,
as a stop-gap measure in the absence of relevant
laws,” 8 in order to “compel the mining sector to shift
to climate-sensitive practices.” 9 Where laws and
regulations exist, contractual provisions should refer
to and strengthen existing statutory provisions.
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In this paper, in turn, we expand the analysis of that
earlier CCSI publication by examining risk allocation
provisions that are commonly used or could be used
in mining contracts 10 and discussing how they should
be drafted—in investor–state contracts and contract
templates—to clearly allocate the risks and impacts
associated with the ever-worsening effects of climate
change between states and mining companies.
Covered in this paper are risk allocation clauses on
force majeure; liability and indemnification or
compensation for climate-related risks; insurance
requirements; change-in-law or stabilization;
periodic review; warranties and representation; stepin rights; and termination; as well as dispute
settlement mechanisms (investor–state arbitration
in particular). 11

2

Risk Allocation Clauses in
Mining Contracts

2.1

Force Majeure

Force majeure clauses—typically included in
investor–state
mining
contracts—excuse
a
contracting party from liability if a reasonably
unforeseeable event beyond the party’s control
prevents it from performing its contractual
obligations. For example, the MMDA defines force
majeure as: 12
any event or circumstance which a Party could
not reasonably be expected to prevent or control,
including
among
other
things,
wars,
insurrections, civil disturbances, blockades,
embargoes, strikes and other labour conflicts,
riots, epidemics, earthquakes, storms, floods, or
other adverse weather conditions, explosions,
fire, lightning, acts of terrorism, or the
unavailability or breakdown of materials or
equipment.
Absent a requirement of a climate risk assessment
based on downscaled climate data, mining investors
facing events attributable to climate change could, in
theory, invoke force majeure clauses to attempt to

escape contractual performance, arguing that they
“could not reasonably be expected to prevent or
control” these events.
However, as climate data becomes more accurate
and robust, and as extreme weather events become
more frequent or intense (or both), climate-related
events are becoming more foreseeable. 13 For
instance, according to McKinsey, 50% of global
production of iron ore and 40% of global production
of zinc are exposed to extremely high flood risk, and
“by 2040, 5% of current gold production will likely
shift from low–medium water stress to medium–
high, 7% of zinc production could move from
medium–high to high water stress, and 6% of copper
production could shift from high to extremely high
water stress.” 14 In addition, even if mining investors
are unable to prevent or control the occurrence of
the events, they can prepare for, prevent, and control
the impacts of the events on their mining investment
as well as on surrounding communities. 15 For
instance, in water-stressed areas, companies can
minimize the water intensity of their operations
whereas in areas prone to flooding, companies
“companies can adopt flood-proof mine designs that
improve drainage and pumping techniques.” 16

Recommendations
Force majeure clauses should:
•
•

•

•

Expressly provide that the definition of force
majeure does not cover climate-related events.
Not include climate-related events (such as
mentions to landslides, droughts, storms, floods,
and other adverse weather conditions) in lists of
events covered by force majeure.
Focus on the foreseeability and reasonableness
of preventing the physical impacts of events on
mining operations and mining communities
rather than focusing on the foreseeability and
ability to prevent the event from occurring.
Require investors to mitigate impacts to
the extent possible and to continue to
perform under the contract to the extent
economically practicable. 17
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•

Specify the legal consequences of force majeure,
indicating which contractual obligations are
suspended (for example, payment or
performance) and which are not (for example,
environmental obligations and the management
of tailings). 18
Require the parties to provide prompt notice of
the event and regular updates on the status of
event and response efforts, and provide for the
possibility of termination or good-faith
renegotiation if performance cannot be resumed
after a given period of time.

•

2.2

Liability and Compensation or
Indemnification

Contracts may establish liability and require one
party to indemnify or compensate the other in given
circumstances. Indemnification clauses can be
broadly worded, such as in the MMDA language: 19
The Company shall at all times indemnify and
hold harmless the State and its officers and
agents from all claims and liabilities for death or
injury to persons or damage to property from any
cause whatsoever arising out of Mining
Operations to the extent that the same arises
from its failure to comply with any Applicable
Law to which it is subject or the terms of
this Agreement.
These clauses can also be very detailed and refer to
specific breaches that would result in
indemnification. For example, a contract from
Liberia specifically requires the state to compensate
the company for any claims brought against the
company stemming from harmful environmental
conditions at the mining site prior to the company
operating the mine. The contract reads: 20
The Government shall indemnify and hold
harmless the Company from any losses and
liability incurred by it resulting from any claims
made against the Company by third parties
which have arisen in connection with Previous
Negative Environmental Impact in respect of
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Land owned by the Government which it has
made available to the Company for the purposes
of Operations…
Other clauses already require compensation when
the company harms the environment, which
implicitly covers climate considerations. An example
listed within the MMDA provides: 21
…COMPANY shall defend, indemnify and hold
harmless
THE
STATE…against
all
Losses…relating to, resulting from, arising out of
or otherwise by virtue of…Environmental
Conditions to the extent such conditions result
from or are adversely affected by COMPANY’s
activities…
As noted, climate-related events are increasingly
foreseeable. Furthermore, mining activities, which
are inherently hazardous, introduce risks and
impacts that can be exacerbated by climate change.
For instance, mining activities can compete with
communities for water in an area where water stress
risk is increasing because of climate change. They
can also exacerbate risks and impacts of climaterelated events. For instance, mining activities can
contribute to deforestation, which exacerbates soil
erosion, landslides, and flooding in the rainy season.
At the same time, mining companies have the
capacity to prepare for, prevent, and control those
risks and impacts. Accordingly, mining companies
should take on responsibility for climate-related risks
and impacts they create or exacerbate.
Investor–state mining contracts should explicitly
affirm the liability of the mining company—and, in
the case of special-purpose vehicles, the parent
company—to the state as well as third parties,
explicitly including individuals and communities, for
any damages caused by climate-related risks
and events that result from or are exacerbated by
mining operations.
Liability and indemnification clauses could also list
contractual breaches that would result in the
company’s obligation to indemnify. For example, the
EMP, based on the climate risk assessment,
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addresses how the company will mitigate the risks
identified in that assessment. The contract could
deem a failure by the company to comply with
environmental and climate
change–related
obligations contained in the EMP as a material
breach of the contract, and accordingly require the
company to compensate the state and any affected
individuals and communities.

that area, 26 and that, when the state purchases the
insurance in lieu of the company, the latter continues
to be liable for any damage resulting from climaterelated impacts of mining operations. As floods and
landslides may become more frequent due to climate
change, special consideration should be taken to
insuring possible damage arising from tailings
dam failures. 27

Recommendations

If a step-in clause is included in the agreement (see
section 2.7), the contract should require that the
project remains insured during instances when the
state or a third party nominated by the state steps in
on behalf of the company. In addition, both the state
and the company should purchase insurance to
cover any losses associated with stepping in. This
additional insurance is most important for the
company, which will typically be liable for all losses if
the step-in resulted from a breach by the company. 28

Mining contracts should:
•

•

2.3

Affirm that the mining company and its parent
company are liable for climate-related impacts of
mining operations.
Impose on the mining company and its parent
company the obligation to indemnify the
state and affected third parties, explicitly
mentioning individuals and communities, for any
damage resulting from climate-related impacts
of mining operations.

Recommendations
•

Insurance

It is becoming more expensive to insure mining
projects, 22 and climate change is partly to blame.
Insurance companies are still figuring out how to
address climate change in their policies, but some
have developed tools to better analyze the risks
posed by climate change. 23 States should
contractually require companies to purchase
insurance from insurers who are using these kinds
of tools. 24
The language of the MMDA makes the company
responsible for purchasing insurance for the mining
project. If the company is unable to purchase the
necessary insurance, the state can purchase it and
must be reimbursed by the company for the cost of
the policy. 25
The risks and impacts of climate change will vary
depending on the location of the mining site, so the
mining contract should specify that the insurance
policy needs to cover the possible climate events in

•

•

•

When possible, states should require
corporations to purchase insurance policies from
brokers who have specific tools to analyze risks
associated with climate change. The analysis
needs to focus on local risks and not just global
predictions of climate trends.
When the state purchases the insurance in lieu of
the company, the contract should indicate that
the company continues to be liable for any
damage resulting from climate-related impacts
of mining operations.
Given that climate change increases the risk of
floods, droughts, and landslides that often cause
tailings dams failures, the contract should
require the mining company to purchase
insurance against damage arising from tailings
dams failures, as well as against damage from
any site-specific risks identified in the climate
risk assessment.
The contract should require that the company
compensate the state for failing to purchase
adequate insurance coverage and for any costs
the state incurs if it purchases insurance
coverage instead.
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•

Contractually required insurance policies should
ensure total coverage for all parties if the state
exercises its step-in rights (see section 2.7).

2.4

Stabilization or
Change-in-Law Clauses

Mining contracts regularly include change-in-law
clauses to prevent new or modified laws from
affecting mining companies. 29 These clauses can
freeze the regulatory landscape (i.e., no new or
amended laws would apply to the company), known
as freezing clauses, or require that the state
compensate the company for the financial impacts of
the new or modified legislation, known as economic
equilibrium clauses. Hybrid clauses (a combination
of the freezing and economic equilibrium clauses)
allow parties to define specifically which changes in
the law should apply to the company and when the
company should be compensated for a change in the
law. 30 Change-in-law clauses can apply to purely
fiscal issues (taxes, royalties, rents, tariffs, etc.), nonfiscal areas (the environment, labor, and health and
safety), or both. 31
Change-in-law clauses should be avoided because
their contractual repercussions can discourage
states from passing positive legislation. 32 A uranium
contract from Malawi provides an example. The
contract contains an economic equilibrium clause
with a ten-year stability period and no carve-outs. 33
If Malawi were to pass climate legislation, the
mining company could claim that the state is
required to compensate it for any losses or
compliance costs resulting from that legislation. This
example highlights why states should avoid
change-in-law clauses.
If a change-in-law clause is included in a mining
agreement, it should be limited to fiscal areas only,
and it should not cover non-fiscal regulatory areas.
See the first part of Principle VII of the OECD Guiding
Principles for Durable Extractive Contracts: 34
Durable extractive contracts are consistent with
applicable laws, applicable international and
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regional treaties, and anticipate that host
governments may introduce bona fide, nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory changes in
law and applicable regulations, covering nonfiscal regulatory areas to pursue legitimate
public interest objectives. The costs
attributable to compliance with such changes
in law and regulations, and wholly, necessarily
and exclusively related to project specific
operations, should be treated as any other
project costs for purposes of tax deductibility,
and cost recovery in production sharing
contracts [emphasis added].
Any change-in-law clause eventually included should
also be a hybrid clause containing an exhaustive list
of changes in fiscal terms of the law that would result
in compensation for the company. For enhanced
clarity, it could explicitly specify that nothing in the
clause can prevent the state from enacting climate
legislation, even if the climate legislation would
touch fiscal areas, like in the case of a carbon tax. In
addition to being limited in scope, it should also be
limited in time, allowing states to pass climate laws
and ensure compliance with them without fear of
endangering existing mining contracts or awarding
companies huge compensation packages for
changing their law. See also the commentary to
Principle VIII: 35
Where governments decide they are necessary,
fiscal stabilisation provisions can be designed to
minimise the general tax policy impact, by
limiting its scope to specific key fiscal terms (not
all fiscal terms), such as agreed rates, for a
specific period of time (not indefinitely), and
possibly by applying a stability premium on
tax rates.

Recommendations
States should not include change-in-law provisions
in mining contracts because these clauses can
discourage states from passing positive legislation.
As an alternative to including a change-in-law clause,
states and investors can agree to a clause on
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mandatory negotiation if a change in law makes it
difficult or impossible for the company to meet its
contractual obligations (see section 2.5). 36 However,
if a stabilization or change-in-law clause is included
in a mining contract, it should:
•

•

•

2.5

Apply to changes in fiscal policy only and to
specific fiscal terms only (i.e., royalties, corporate
income tax, customs tariffs, etc.), and not to nonfiscal issues (i.e., regulations governing the
environment, labor, and health and safety), so
that states can still regulate the environment and
enact emissions standards without fear of
contractual repercussions.
Specifically reaffirm that the state has a
sovereign right to pass climate legislation, even if
it relates to fiscal policy (e.g., taxes on carbon),
without having to compensate the company, to
explicitly allow the state to enact or change
climate legislation that may have a fiscal impact
on companies.
Be bound in time so that the change-in-law
clause expires and does not have a chilling effect
for the entire term of the mining agreement.

Periodic Review

Periodic review mechanisms in contracts allow for
parties to come together and discuss in good faith
whether the contract needs to be modified.
Contracts can allow for the review to occur at regular
intervals at the request of one or both of the parties.
Usually, for one party to be able to call for periodic
review, there needs to be some trigger event—either
a profound change in circumstances or an impact on
the parties’ rights and obligations. Trigger events can
be vaguely or explicitly defined within the
agreement. Whether a trigger event occurred is “a
crucial element of the Periodic Review Mechanisms”
because it determines whether there is a need for the
contract to be modified. 37 Accordingly, periodic
review meetings that happen at regular intervals
often discuss whether a trigger event has occurred,
and disputes can arise when the parties disagree
about the occurrence of a trigger event.

One possible trigger event is the occurrence of a
change in law that results in the mining company’s
“inability to perform its material obligations under
the contract” or in a “material adverse change that
undermines the economic viability of the mining
project”; in such cases, in line with the second part of
Principle VII of the OECD Guiding Principles for
Durable Extractive Contracts, the contract should
“require the parties to engage in good faith
discussions which might eventually lead the parties
to agree to renegotiate the terms of the contract.” 38
To ensure that climate considerations are regularly
included and updated in mining contracts, a general
periodic review provision should be included that
requires parties to come together every three to five
years and engage in a good-faith discussion to
determine if any modifications need to be made to
the mining agreement. Specific contractual
provisions should be given special consideration
when determining if any modifications are required.
Force
majeure
clauses,
the
company’s
environmental and climate-related obligations, and
insurance provisions should be given special
attention as the likelihood of certain climate-related
environmental disasters may have changed over the
years. The contract should contain a non-exhaustive
list of climate-related trigger events, including
updates to local and global scientific forecasts of
climate patterns and extreme weather events.
Parties should consider including a “ratchet
mechanism” in mining contracts to prevent parties
from removing or reducing a party’s climate-related
obligations, as well as a best-efforts obligation on
parties to increase their level of ambition in any
renegotiation opportunity. Ratchet mechanisms can
be modeled after the approach of the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change, which prevents
states from adopting emissions reduction targets
that are less ambitious than their previous goals. 39
What specifically is protected with a ratchet
mechanism will be site-specific and should be
negotiated by the parties. Additionally, parties can
agree to let the ratchet mechanism expire should
climate forecasts drastically change for the better.
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Recommendations
Mining contracts should include:
•

A general periodic review provision requiring the
parties to come together every three to five years
and engage in good-faith discussions about
whether any provisions need to be modified. The
provision could also require the parties to give
special consideration during these discussions to
the need to strengthen the company’s
environmental and climate-related obligations
or revise clauses on insurance policies and force
majeure in light of scientific findings about
potential climate impacts.
A non-exhaustive list of events that would trigger
the obligation to renegotiate in good faith,
including updated climate forecasts (especially
local ones) and environmental disasters.
A ratchet mechanism to prevent parties
from rolling back climate-related contractual
obligations.
A best-efforts obligation on parties to
increase their level of ambition in any
renegotiation opportunity.

•

•

•

2.6

Warranties and Representation

Warranties and representations are included in
contracts as assertions relating to some fact that is
true at the time when the warranty or representation
is made. Warranties are more important for our
purposes of allocating risks between parties as a
warranty is not only an assertion but also “a promise
of indemnity if the assertion is false.” 40 However,
because representations and warranties are usually
temporally focused on the present, and the effects of
climate change will be felt in the future, these clauses
can only be of so much use to stop parties from
seeking to avoiding liability during climate
emergencies.
Currently,
environment-related
warranties are usually general declarations that the
company has not violated, and is not currently
violating, any environmental law in the jurisdiction of
the mine or any other jurisdiction. The state
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sometimes makes warranties about the presence of
hazardous waste or other pollutants on the project
site or its surroundings. 41
Sometimes, however, warranties can be forwardlooking. For example, a mining contract from the
Democratic Republic of Congo warrants that the
company will operate the mine in compliance with
environmental laws and warrants to take measures
to protect the environment and public infrastructure,
mitigate environmental damage, comply with
environmental laws, restore used mining sites, and
begin treating water in and around the mining site: 42
The activities of T.F.M. will be carried on in
compliance with environmental standards
internationally accepted as good Mining practice.
In addition, T.F.M. undertakes:
to take adequate measures, for the duration of
this Agreement,
to protect the environment and the public
infrastructures used beyond normal industrial
use, in compliance with the rules and uses
internationally accepted in the Mining industry,
as far as these may be applied in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and with the laws in force on
the date of the Original Convention;
to mitigate, by adequate measures, the damage
which could be caused to the environment and to
the public infrastructure used beyond normal
industrial use;
to comply with the legislation in force on the date
of the Original Convention concerning dangerous
waste, damage to natural resources, and
protection of the environment;
to restore used sites and the excavated plots of
land in compliance with the rules and uses
internationally accepted in the Mining industry,
as far as these may be applied in the Democratic
Republic of Congo;
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to comply with the provisions of the Forest Code,
in particular those relating to the reclamation
along banks, rivers, and slopes; and
to set up a system for the purification or
treatment of used or residual water from the
mines and plants, which are released from the
areas foreseen in the works program.
The effects of forward-looking warranties are better
achieved through other contractual provisions, like
indemnification and termination provisions (see
sections 2.2 and 2.8), which require the company to
compensate the state or allow the state to terminate
the contract if the company fails to perform any of its
contractual obligations, respectively. However, a
warranty like the one above could be useful in
removing any trace of ambiguity about the
obligations of the company.
Climate change–related obligations could be
strengthened or incorporated into warranties by
broadening declarations regarding good standing on
environmental “and climate-related” laws. This
change could be useful in ensuring companies
comply with climate regulations, such as emissions
reporting or reductions requirements as well as the
requirements to adapt industrial activities to climate
change and make them climate resilient.

Recommendations
•
•

2.7

Where feasible, climate concerns should be
added to standard environmental warranties.
Contracts could restate the company’s
environmental and climate-related obligations
as forward-looking warranties made by the
company to remove any ambiguity about the
company’s obligations and the consequence for
failing to meet them.

Step-in Rights

Step-in provisions within mining contracts allow for
the state or a party it nominates to step in and
perform the contractual obligations of the company

when it is unable to do so or has committed a breach
that allowed the state to step in. 43 Stepping in is also
something done in emergencies, which are defined
by a Cameroonian contract containing a step-in
provision as an event that “is likely to create an
immediate and serious threat to the health or safety
of the public, any material property, [or] the
Environment.” 44
The inclusion of a step-in clause itself does not create
any liability or require the state to step in. However,
once a state steps in, some liabilities may shift from
the company to the state. Generally, if a state is
stepping in due to a breach of contract by a company,
the state inherits no liability from the company. If the
state is stepping in due to an event partially caused
by the company, liability is allocated according to the
terms and step-in processes agreed to in the
contract. 45 When the state steps in without the
occurrence of a breach or event caused by the
actions of the company, the state inherits complete
liability.
Contracts should include step-in clauses to allow
states to step in during environmental disasters
when the company is unable to handle the event.
When the state steps in due to an extreme weather
event that prevents the company from performing its
obligations, this situation usually falls under the
force majeure clause, which prevents the state from
holding the company liable for its failure to perform.
However, the effects of climate change will result in
extreme weather events happening more regularly
(see section 2.1), so it is becoming increasingly
inadequate to allow companies to avoid liability (or
pass their liability on to the state) when an extreme
weather event occurs. Therefore, if there is reason to
believe that the company did not take reasonable
precautions and it led to the state needing to step in
during an extreme weather event, the company
should remain liable for any damages, as it would if it
had committed any other breach.
In the context of public–private partnerships, step-in
clauses are much more common between lenders
and private partners than in contracts signed
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between the state and a private party. 46 Step-in
clauses seem to be uncommon also in the mining
context: in over 900 mining contracts published on
ResourceContracts.org, only 2 mentioned step-in
rights. 47 Only one of those two allowed the state to
step in and take control of mining operations. The
other simply allowed the state to find another
company to operate the mine should the original
investor fail to make payments to the state. The
former type of clause is most relevant for the climate
context, but it may be worth including the second as
well to cover situations where a climate catastrophe
creates extreme losses for the company and the
mining project is no longer tenable.
The final consideration for step-in rights is the
procedure for both stepping in and stepping out. The
parties negotiate these procedures, which are
therefore largely dependent on the wants of the
parties. Notice and standard of care requirements
are two common procedural points of discussion
that are particularly relevant to exercising step-in
rights during or in the aftermath of extreme weather
events and other climate-related occurrences.

with a certain standard of care. 50 States should be
aware if this is the case in their jurisdiction. If the law
requires a standard of care, mining agreements
should, at a minimum, restate or explicitly refer to
the statutory requirement or reinforce it as
appropriate. If no statutory requirement exists, to
ensure that the mining project is properly cared for
while the state is stepping in and that no unnecessary
additional losses are accrued during a possible
extreme weather event or other climate-related
event, the step-in clause should require the state to
at least adhere to industry best practice while in
control of the mining project. Additionally, the
private partner should be required to make a
reasonable effort in assisting the state once it has
stepped in.

Recommendations
•

Step-in clauses should expressly provide that the
state inherits no liability and must be
compensated if its stepping-in was caused by a
real or anticipated breach by the company, such
as the failure to build resilient operations in the
face of growing climate change risks.
The mining contract should lay out the
procedures for stepping in, including notice and
standard-of-care requirements, and allow the
state to step in with minimal notice in the case of
emergencies.
The contract should, at a minimum, require the
state to adhere to industry best practice and the
company to take reasonable efforts to assist the
state once it has stepped in. If there are statutory
requirements of a certain standard of care by the
state, the company, or both when the step-in
clause is invoked, the contract should restate,
refer to, or reinforce the level of care within them.

Some notice period should be required before a state
can step in due to other kinds of contractual
breaches by the company, but the contract should
specify that the state has the right to step in
immediately in cases of emergencies. For example,
one of the contracts mentioned above calls for notice
“within five (5) Business Days of such notice, or such
shorter period as is appropriate in the case of an
emergency…” 48 Notice requirements can also be
applied to stepping out, but this remains at the
discretion of the parties. Stepping out can be done
when the event that led to the stepping-in has ended
or after a step-out plan has been followed, granting
full operational control back to the company. 49 The
parties should address this largely site-specific
concern during the contract negotiation phase.

•

Standard-of-care requirements refer to the level of
care required of both the state and the company
once the state has stepped in. In some jurisdictions,
statutes mandate either or both parties to comply

Contracts typically include termination procedures,
which often require a party to take efforts to remedy
any breach it is responsible for before the other party
can terminate the contract. As a last resort in cases of
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•

2.8

Termination
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breach, one of the parties may be entitled to
unilaterally terminate the contract.
The MMDA contains two standards for termination by
the parties. A mining company may (a) terminate the
contract if the state breaches it or (b) simply
surrender its contractual rights with six months’
advance notice. A state is only allowed to unilaterally
terminate the contract if at least one of the following
so-called “default events” occurs: (a) production has
not commenced by a certain date specified in the
contract, (b) the company fails to make a payment
after 60 days following the state notifying the
company of the missed payment, (c) the company (or
its parent company) dissolves or is unable to perform
its obligations under the contract, or (d) the company
materially breaches its contract with the state. 51
The MMDA’s list of default events is fairly limited
compared to default events that mining contracts list
or could list, such as social and environmental
breaches. 52 An Afghan copper mining contract lists
any “breach by the Company of any of its obligations
pertaining to health and safety of labour, human
rights, protection of the Environment or protection of
affected communities as set out in this Contract”
among its list of over a dozen events allowing for the
state to terminate the agreement. 53 Egypt’s model
exploration license even contains a default event
specifically referring to environmental harms
committed by the company: “If it is proved that the
licensed area is polluted due to a cause attributable
to the licensee and the licensee does not remedy it,
in spite of warnings by [the Egyptian Government].” 54
The language of these default events could be
expanded and adapted to the climate context. For
example, if a company exceeds the emissions limit
agreed to in the contract and fails to remedy its
excess emissions or if it fails to meet specifically
stated climate adaptation obligations, the state
should have the right to terminate the contract.
While the default events highlighted are specific, it is
not uncommon for lists of default events to contain
general language referring to any breach or failure to
live up to contractual obligations or any violation of

mining or environmental law as default events.
General clauses like this are useful as they serve as
extra security allowing for termination by the state if
the company fails to meet certain requirements such
as purchasing adequate insurance coverage for the
mining project. Accordingly, mining contracts should
specifically list the company’s failure to meet climate
mitigation and adaptation obligations included in
the contract as a material breach and a default event
allowing unilateral termination by the state.
Certain responsibilities do not disappear once the
contract has been terminated. The MMDA states that
“no obligations or liabilities exist for both parties
once the surrender has been completed by the
company, but any obligations and liabilities existing
before the date of surrender still exist” 55 and that
companies must “comply with the Environmental
Management Plan or the Closure Plan as required to
avoid imminent damage to the environment.” 56
While climate change considerations may and should
be included in EMPs, adding specific language
referring to the company’s climate obligations would
eliminate any doubt as to whether a company
remains responsible for their climate change due
diligence obligations at the mine site after
termination. These obligations should continue to
exist at least until the state contracts with another
company for the operation of the mining project.

Recommendations
Mining contracts should include:
•

•

•

Clear termination procedures for when a
breach has occurred, outlining when it may
result in a sanction, indemnification, or
unilateral termination.
A general clause allowing for termination by the
state in the case of contractual breaches or
violation of the law by the company.
A list of “events of default” or “termination on
certain events” which would allow the state to
terminate the contract if the company fails to
meet specific environmental or climate change–
related obligations.
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•

Language clarifying that environmental and
climate change–related obligations and any
associated liabilities remain with the parties even
after the contract is terminated. These
obligations and liabilities should continue to
exist until the state contracts with another entity
to operate the mine.

3

Dispute Settlement

Though not considered risk allocation provisions,
dispute settlement clauses in investor–state mining
contracts deserve a brief discussion in this study as
they play an important role in the enforcement of the
risk allocation provisions discussed in previous
sections. Dispute settlement clauses designate
where, under what law, and through what processes
disputes between the parties will be resolved. They
usually indicate domestic courts, domestic
arbitration, or international arbitration as the forum
that will hear contract-based disputes that may arise.
Many investor–state mining contracts provide for
international arbitration, and the MMDA suggests
including an international arbitration clause. 57
Despite the widespread use of arbitration clauses in
investor–state mining contracts and templates,
research and practice show that arbitration can have
various unintended and undesirable consequences.
It can, for example, undermine sovereignty,
regulatory space, and the rule of law. 58 Private
arbitrators have discretion as to whether and how to
apply the law of the host state. Arbitrators can and
often do also second guess the legitimacy and even
override the public interest–focused determinations
of regulatory and administrative agencies.
Transparency and opportunities for public
participation in the proceedings are also subject to
the discretion of the arbitrators; they are limited in
most arbitrations compared to domestic court
proceedings, where a certain level of disclosure is
required, cases often become a part of the public
record, and third-party interventions are routinely
allowed in matters of public interest. In arbitration,
there typically are no opportunities to correct errors
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of law or fact, given that arbitral awards, unlike
most domestic court judgments, are not subject
to appeal. 59
Although arbitration is often marketed as being
better than adjudication by local courts, its
advantages are not always clear, and any benefits
that do exist may be enjoyed disproportionately by
the investor, while the state and its people bear a
larger share of the costs. 60 For example, the average
cost of defending a treaty-based investor–state
arbitration case is roughly USD 4.7 million, and even
victorious states often are left to bear those fees. 61
Arbitration awards can reach staggering sums in the
order of billions of U.S. dollars; the average is roughly
USD 504 million. 62 Many of the largest awards have
been related to mining investments, for example, a
USD 4 billion award (plus interest) against Pakistan. 63
In the context of climate change, there is a risk that a
mining company may bring arbitration claims
against the state to either escape contractual
performance or avoid liability for climate-related
damage (invoking force majeure clauses), to claim
compensation from the state for any negative
economic effects of climate regulation (invoking
stabilization or change-in-law clauses), or to
challenge the state’s decision to exercise its step-in
rights. Previous literature has cautioned against the
risk of arbitration claims in which investors challenge
regulatory measures adopted by states to address
the climate emergency, such as to decarbonize their
economies in line with the Paris Agreement
and advance the zero-carbon energy transition. 64
These claims are now materializing, and with
increasing frequency. 65
Because the benefits of arbitration are uncertain
while its risks and costs are high, and because
domestic courts are better suited to determine the
legal consequences of climate change as well as legal
and policy responses to it, investor–state mining
contracts and model mining agreements should not
include arbitration clauses. Instead, they should
require that disputes arising out of the contract be
resolved by the host state’s domestic courts,
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supported by technical expertise (including that from
climate scientists) as appropriate. If states agree to
include an arbitration clause in the contract, they
need to make sure to receive adequate consideration
in exchange for this concession, which requires
taking several aspects into account. Detailed
discussions about the risks of arbitration alluded to
above and the considerations on the agreement to
arbitrate, if included in the contract, lie beyond the
scope of this paper. Finally, while important, the lack
of a provision on contract-based arbitration does not
eliminate the risk of potential treaty-based claims.

4

Recommendation

While the suggestions discussed in this paper can be
useful as general guidelines, contracts will need to be
specific to the project and the jurisdiction where it is
taking place. Further research could focus on
drafting model language that can be applied broadly
to assist states and companies in incorporating
climate risks into model mining agreements and
project-specific contracts.

Mining contracts should not include international
arbitration clauses; instead, states should consider
alternatives to investor–state arbitration, 66 such as
adjudication by the host state’s domestic courts.

Conclusion

This paper detailed how common risk allocation
provisions can be used in mining contracts to better
allocate climate risks and impacts between states
and mining companies. There is a pressing need to
better allocate these risks due to the immense threat
climate change presents worldwide. These risks are
exacerbated by the fact that many mines are located
in resource-rich developing countries, like many
African countries, where the effects of climate
change tend to be the most severe. 67

Finally, revisiting risk allocation clauses in investor–
state mining contracts and reframing them from a
climate change lens does not obviate the pressing
need to incorporate climate change considerations
into the climate, environmental, water, forestry,
energy, and mining laws of mineral-rich countries. As
noted, domestic legal and regulatory systems
governing the mining sector are ideally placed as
legal instruments to regulate the sector’s
contribution to climate change mitigation and
adaptation, and, therefore, to allocate and manage
climate-related risks of mining operations.
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